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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID A. RENN, 
Petitioner-Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 930796-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Priority No. 3 
Respondent-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of 
a petition for post-conviction relief involving a second degree 
felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging various errors in connection with his plea of no contest. 
The district court dismissed the petition. The issues raised on 
appeal are: 
1. Was the district court obligated to hold an 
evidentiary hearing or enter findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in ruling on the petition? 
2. Was the district court's dismissal of the petition 
proper? 
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3. Does petitioner's failure to pursue a direct appeal 
procedurally bar him from challenging the validity of his plea in 
a petition for post-conviction relief? 
4. Did the district court properly dismiss as frivolous 
several of petitioner's claims? 
In reviewing an appeal from the dismissal of a petition 
for post-conviction relief, "no deference is accorded the lower 
court's conclusions of law that underlie the dismissal of the 
petition. [This Court] review[s] those for correctness." Gerrish 
v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 1992) (citing Fernandez v. 
Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes 
or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented are 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 30, 1990, petitioner pled no contest in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court, Sevier County, to manslaughter, a second 
degree felony (R. 13-26, 183; Addendum A). On July 11, 1990, the 
trial court sentenced petitioner to serve 1-15 years at the Utah 
State Prison and to pay a $10,000 fine and an unspecified amount of 
restitution (R. 70). Petitioner did not appeal the propriety of 
his plea or sentence. 
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On August 17, 1993, petitioner filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief, claiming that: (1) the trial court did not 
comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting 
his plea because it failed to ensure that the plea was knowingly 
and voluntarily entered, confirm that petitioner understood the 
elements of the offense, and advise petitioner of the time limit in 
which to file a motion to withdraw his plea; (2) his plea was 
unintelligent because he did not know the elements of manslaughter; 
(3) the evidence was insufficient to convict him; (4) the 
prosecutor overcharged him; and (5) he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel (R. 1-6) . The district court dismissed 
claims 3-5 above as frivolous and ordered respondent to respond to 
the remaining two (2) claims (R. 164-65) . 
On October 20, 1993, the district court entered an order 
granting respondent's motion to dismiss (R. 216; Addendum B). On 
October 21, 1993, petitioner filed an objection (R. 217-220). On 
November 17, 1993, the district court entered an order of 
dismissal, finding that petitioner entered his plea knowingly and 
voluntarily (R. 221-222; Addendum C) . Petitioner filed his notice 
of appeal on November 30, 1993 (R. 223). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner was initially charged with second degree 
murder, a first degree felony, but pursuant to a plea bargain, 
entered a plea of no contest to the lesser charge of manslaughter 
(R. 13-26, 183; Addendum A)(R. 32; Addendum D). During the plea 
colloquy, the trial court found that petitioner was "aware of his 
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rights, he understands the offense charged, and he knowingly and 
intentionally and voluntarily entered his plea . . . " (R. 22; 
Addendum A). Furthermore, the trial court noted that petitioner 
"executed a plea agreement in open Court. He's executed a 
statement and initialed every paragraph, showing he's read the same 
in open Court ..." (id.) . The Statement of Defendant in Advance 
of Plea lists the elements of manslaughter and informs petitioner 
what the State would have to prove if the matter went to trial (R. 
27-28; Addendum E). Additionally, the amended information details 
the elements of manslaughter (R. 46-47; Addendum F) . The trial 
court clerk read the amended information aloud during the plea 
colloquy (R. 20; Addendum A). Also during the colloquy, the 
prosecutor detailed the facts supporting the plea to the 
manslaughter charge (R. 16-18; Addendum A). The trial court did 
not inform petitioner of the 3 0-day time period in which to file a 
motion to withdraw his plea. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court was not required to hold an 
evidentiary hearing prior to reaching the merits of petitioner's 
claims, or to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Pursuant to rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, evidentiary 
and dispositive hearings are optional, as are findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
Review of the record demonstrates that the district court 
correctly dismissed the petition, finding that petitioner entered 
his plea knowingly and voluntarily. Furthermore, the trial court 
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complied with rule 11(e)(2) and (4), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The trial court failed to advise petitioner of the time 
limitation for seeking withdrawal of his plea, as required by rule 
11(e)(7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, rule 11 
specifically provides that the failure to advise a defendant of 
that time limitation is not a ground for granting withdrawal of the 
plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f). 
Petitioner's failure to pursue a direct appeal 
procedurally bars him from litigating the validity of his plea in 
a petition for post-conviction relief, absent unusual 
circumstances. The petition contains no facts which amount to 
unusual circumstances justifying petitioner's failure to challenge 
his plea on direct appeal. Accordingly, the district court 
properly dismissed of the petition. 
Finally, the district court properly dismissed as 
frivolous, petitioner's claims of insufficient evidence, 
overcharging, and ineffective assistance of counsel. By entering 
a knowing and voluntary plea, petitioner waived his right to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of the 
charge. Petitioner's claim of ineffective counsel may have been 
properly before the district court, however, petitioner failed to 
allege facts which, if true, would demonstrate either deficient 
performance or prejudice. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO HOLD AN 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING PRIOR TO DISMISSING THE 
PETITION OR TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
On appeal, petitioner claims that the district court 
erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition and by failing to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law (Br. of App. at 2) . Rule 65B, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, governs extraordinary writs and provides that 
after the pleadings are closed, the district court shall hold a 
hearing "or otherwise dispose of the case." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(b)(10) (emphasis added). Petitioner attached to his petition, 
the plea and sentencing transcripts, the Statement of Defendant, 
the Plea Agreement, and all other documents necessary to a ruling 
on his claims (R. 12-163). Since petitioner's non-frivolous claims 
concerned only the propriety of his plea, the district court needed 
only to review the plea colloquy and plea documents in order to 
resolve the issues. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing was not 
necessary. 
Rule 65B(b) also states that the court "shall enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, as appropriate, following 
an evidentiary hearing or any hearing on a dispositive motion." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(ll) (emphasis added). Since the district 
court did not hold an evidentiary or dispositive motion hearing, 
subsection (b)(11) does not apply. Nevertheless, the rule grants 
the district court discretion to enter findings of fact and 
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conclusions of law, as appropriate. Id. Since rule 65B(b) does 
not mandate a hearing or findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
petitioner's claims are meritless. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE 
PETITION; PETITIONER'S PLEA WAS KNOWING AND 
VOLUNTARY AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11 
Although the district court's Order Granting Motion to 
Dismiss states that petitioner failed to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, the court actually ruled on the merits of 
petitioner's non-frivolous claims (R. 216; Addendum B). In both 
the Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and the Order of Dismissal, 
the district court specifically found that petitioner's plea was 
knowing and voluntary (id.) (R. 221; Addendum C) . The record fully 
supports the district court's conclusion. 
A. Constitutionality of Plea 
The test for determining the constitutionality of a 
guilty plea is "whether the plea represents a voluntary and 
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to 
the defendant." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (citing 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). It is well 
established that a guilty plea is not voluntary "in the sense that 
it constitutes an intelligent admission that the accused committed 
the offense unless the accused has received real notice of the true 
nature of the charge against him." Marshall v. Lonberaer, 459 U.S. 
422, 436 (1983) (citations omitted) . See also State v. Thorup, 841 
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P.2d 746, 748 (Utah App. 1992) ; State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 338 
(Utah 1977) (in order for guilty plea to be valid, defendant must 
have had a clear understanding of the charge and have entered the 
plea v/ithout undue influence or coercion) . 
The Statement of Defendant lists the elements of 
manslaughter and informs petitioner what the State would have to 
prove if the matter went to trial. Additionally, the amended 
information details the elements of manslaughter. The trial court 
clerk read the amended information aloud in open court during the' 
plea colloquy and petitioner received his own copy. Also during 
the colloquy, the prosecutor detailed the facts supporting the plea 
to the manslaughter charge. 
The foregoing demonstrates that petitioner was well 
apprised of the elements of manslaughter, as well as the specific 
facts supporting the charge. Based upon the plea documents and its 
colloquy with petitioner, the trial court specifically determined 
that petitioner's plea was knowing and voluntary. The district 
court's review of the record led it to the same conclusion, 
warranting dismissal of the petition. 
B. Compliance with Rule 11 
Petitioner claims that the trial court failed to ensure 
that his plea was knowing and voluntary and that he understood the 
elements of manslaughter, as required by rule 11(e)(2) and (4), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Additionally, petitioner claims 
that the trial court failed to advise him of the time limit for 
seeking to withdraw his plea. Respondent acknowledges that 
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petitioner was not advised, either by the trial court or in the 
Statement of Defendant, of the 3 0-day time period in which to seek 
withdrawal of his plea. However, rule 11 specifically states that 
this deficiency is not a ground for setting aside an otherwise 
knowing and voluntary plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f). Petitioner 
may be entitled to have the time limitation for seeking withdrawal 
of his plea extended, however, he is not entitled to withdraw his 
plea. Id.. 
Compliance with rule 11 is not constitutionally mandated. 
Rather, rule 11 is simply a device intended to ensure that a plea 
is knowing and voluntary. See Salazar v. Warden, Utah State 
Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993). Nevertheless, it is clear 
under Utah law that in accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, a 
trial court must strictly comply with rule 11. See State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-14 (Utah 1987). The Utah Supreme 
Court has held, however, that in examining a trial court's 
compliance with rule 11, a reviewing court is not limited to the 
plea colloquy. State v. Macruire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581 (Utah App. 1992). Where it is 
properly incorporated into the record, a plea affidavit may form 
part of the basis for finding strict compliance. Maauire, 830 P.2d 
at 217. 
As noted previously, the Statement of Defendant and the 
amended information list the elements of manslaughter. The trial 
court clerk read the amended information aloud in open court during 
the plea colloquy and petitioner received his own copy. Also 
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during the colloquy, the prosecutor detailed the facts supporting 
the plea to the manslaughter charge. Based upon the plea documents 
and its colloquy with petitioner, the trial court specifically 
found that petitioner was aware of his rights, understood the 
manslaughter charge, and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
entered his plea. After finding that petitioner had fully executed 
the plea affidavit in open court, the trial court accepted the Plea 
Agreement and the Statement of Defendant and incorporated them into 
the record1. 
The foregoing demonstrates that the trial court ensured 
that petitioner understood the nature of the charges against him, 
and specifically found that the plea was knowing and voluntary, as 
required by rule 11(e) (2) and (4) . Accordingly, the district court 
properly dismissed the petition. 
POINT III 
PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO PURSUE A DIRECT APPEAL 
PROCEDURALLY BARS HIM PROM CHALLENGING THE 
VALIDITY OF HIS PLEA IN A PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
A writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief is not 
a substitute for direct appeal and cannot be used to circumvent 
regular appellate review. Gerrish v. Barnes. 844 P.2d 315, 319 
1The Statement of Defendant attached as Addendum F is 
unsigned because it was simply petitioner's copy, which he attached 
to his petition. Neither party below procured a copy of the 
original from the criminal file. However, the transcript of the 
change of plea demonstrates that petitioner fully executed the plea 
affidavit during the plea colloquy (R. 22; Addendum A) . 
Furthermore, petitioner has not claimed that the plea affidavit was 
not properly incorporated into the record. 
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(Utah 1992); Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989); Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P. 2d 1101 (Utah 1983) . The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: 
It is therefore well settled in this state 
that allegations of error that could have been 
but were not raised on appeal from a criminal 
conviction cannot be raised by habeas corpus 
or postconviction review, except in unusual 
circumstances. 
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1104. In Pascual v. Carver, 240 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
foregoing principle and clearly pronounced that the failure to 
raise on direct appeal all issues which were known or should have 
been known results in waiver of those claims. Id. 
Petitioner's claims either were known or should have been 
known to him by the time he was sentenced. Therefore, petitioner 
could and should have raised his claims on direct appeal. 
Petitioner's failure to pursue a direct appeal procedurally bars 
him from litigating his claims in a petition for extraordinary 
relief, absent unusual circumstances. Petitioner has failed to 
allege any unusual circumstances warranting his failure to pursue 
a direct appeal and, therefore, the district court properly 
dismissed the petition. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED AS 
FRIVOLOUS SEVERAL OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS 
The district court properly dismissed as frivolous, 
petitioner's claims of insufficient evidence, overcharging, and 
ineffective assistance of counsel. By knowingly and voluntarily 
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pleading guilty, petitioner waived his right to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of the charge. See 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); State v. Serv, 
758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988) (voluntary guilty plea waives 
right to challenge all nonjurisdictional claims, including alleged 
pre-plea constitutional violations) . Accordingly, the district 
court properly dismissed these claims as frivolous. 
The district court also properly dismissed as frivolous 
petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In order 
to prevail on such a claim, petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) 
specific acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). To satisfy the first of the two 
prongs, petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's "representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688. This requires a showing that counsel made errors 
so serious that he was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed 
the defendant by the sixth amendment. Id. Accord State v. 
Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the United 
States Supreme Court clarified the requirements of the prejudice 
prong with respect to allegations of ineffective counsel during the 
plea process. The Court held that in order to satisfy the 
prejudice prong of Strickland, a petitioner "must show that there 
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is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added). The purpose of requiring a 
demonstration of prejudice from petitioners who challenge the 
validity of their guilty pleas on the ground of ineffective counsel 
is to maintain the "fundamental interest in the finality of guilty 
pleas." Id. at 58. In Hill, the Court dismissed the petition 
based solely on petitioner Hill's failure to allege the requisite 
prejudice: "We conclude that petitioner's allegations are 
insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington requirement of 
prejudice . . . [because] [p] etitioner did not allege in his habeas 
petition, that had counsel correctly informed him about his parole 
eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on 
going to trial." Id. 
In this case, petitioner failed to allege specific facts 
which, if true, would demonstrate either deficient performance or 
prejudice. Since petitioner failed to state a claim under 
Strickland and Hill, the district court properly dismissed this 
allegation as frivolous. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondents respectfully 
request that this Court affirm the district court's dismissal of 
the petition for post-conviction relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9 (g^dav of September, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
ANGELA P. MICKLOS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
rj U^^dav of September, 1994 to: 
David A. Renn 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
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1
 10:00 A.M. 
30TH MAY 1990 
2 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
3
 I THE COURT: The next matter on the calendar is No, 
4
 1217, State of Utah vs. David Arlan Renn, is Mr. Renn 
5 present? 
* MR, HUNT: He is. Your Honor. 
7
 CHANGE OF PLEA 
8 THE COURT: Thank you. The record should indicate 
* that David Arlan Renn is present, personally. He's 
io represented by his Attorney, Mr. Laurence Hunt. The State of 
ii Utah is present, represented by R. Don BrouKi. 
12 It says entry of plea, but I note there has been a 
13 plea entered. 
14 MR. BROWN: It's a change of plea, Your Honor. 
15 MR. HUNT: It's a change of plea. 
16 II CLERK: It's a change of plea, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: I don't have anything before me. 
18 CLERK: I put in, u/hile you u/ere talking, an amended 
19 information there. 
20 THE COURT: Excuse me. My Clerk says she put it in 
2i the file after I'd looked in it, so the record should indicate 
22 there's an amended information filed. 
23 For the purpose of the record I'll hand the copy of 
24 the amended information to Mr. Renn and to his Attorney, and I 
25 assume there's been plea negotiations— 
— /C— 
i*y*si~> -^ 
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1
 MR, HUNT: There has. Your Honor. 
2
 THE COURT: — i n this matter. 
3I Will you please tell me what the bargain is, 
4
 Counsel. 
5
 Mr. Renn t you may be seated. But if you will, 
6
 listen very careful to what the Attorneys state. 
7
 The record should indicate that I've heretofore 
* advised Mr. Renn of his constitutional rights, that he was 
9
 II charged u/ith a crime known as murder in the second degree, a 
felony in the first degree; that he entered a plea of not 
guilty to this charge, and the Jury Trial was set for July 
12 16th and the Clerk was instructed to bring in 60 Jurors. So 
13 that's the status of the record at this time. 
14
 I'll hear you. Counsel. 
15 PLAINTIFF'S OPENING STATEMENT 
16 BY MR. BROWN: Your Honor, there have been a 
17
 considerable amount of negotiations between myself and Mr. 
*8 Hunt, who represents Mr. Renn, with regard to a disposition of 
19 this action. Based upon those negotiations we have filed the 
20 amended information that was filed this morning, charging the 
21 Defendant with manslaughter, a felony of the second degree. 
22 it's my understanding that in return for our 
23 concession in reducing the offense to manslaughter, that the 
24 Defendant is prepared to enter a plea of no contest to the 
25 charge and the State has agreed to recommend to the Court that 
~/£-i 
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the Defendant be aiiou/ea to so plead. 
I might advise the Court that on the date of the 
offenses listed in the information, police officers were 
called to the residence of Mr. Renn and his common law u/ife; 
that the u/ife u/as found in the bed, that she had suffered a 
tremendous beating, that she was near death at the time the 
officers arrived. She was subsequently taken in an ambulance 
to the Sevier Valley Hospital and then transported north, and 
she died at the Utah Valley Hospital, later on. 
Pursuant to a number of search warrants, a good deal 
of evidence was taken from the residence with regard to 
potential weapons used and there were also a considerable 
number of evidentiary items photographed at the residence. 
There were also blood alcohol tests taken from the Defendant 
and from the victim and there has been a considerable amount 
of investigation with regard to the background of both of the 
Defendants. 
$04owJ The State is of the opinion that were this matter to 
go to trial, there would be issues relating to provocation, 
there would be issues relating to the intoxication of the 
Defendant and to the intoxication of the victim and to both of 
their abilities to understand what was occurring at the time. 
Based upon those issues, it's the State's belief that there is 
a possibility that a Jury would render a verdict of guilty to 
the offense of manslaughter in lieu of second degree murder, 
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as orginally outlined. We believe that that would be the 
issue u/ere this case to go to trial A that issue along u/ith the 
issue of u/hether# in fact, this Defendant actually did the 
beating of the woman. 
We havef u/e believe, substantial evidence u/hich 
would support the fact that it was this Defendantf including 
blood spattered boots of the Defendant. The victim was kicked 
in several portions of her body and we believe that the 
evidence supports the fact that it was this Defendant that 
caused the injuries that resulted in her death. However, we 
believe that the issues with regard to the nature of the 
offense, be that manslaughter or murder, would be a serious 
issue at trial. On that basis we have agreed to recommend to 
the Court that Mr. Renn be allowed to enter a plea of no 
contest to the offense of manslaughter, and there has been 
prepared a statement for the Defendant to execute with regard 
to the bargain that we've entered into. 
THE COURT: Is that your agreement, Mr. Hunt? 
MR. HUNT: Without all the other information 
involved in it, yes, it is, Your Honor, that we enter a plea 
of no contest to manslaughter in lieu of the second degree 
murder. 
THE COURT: Mr. Renn, will you please stand. 
[DEFENDANT RESPONDED] 
Mr. Renn, I heretofore advised you of your constitutional 
-/f-
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1 rights; is that correct? 
2 1 MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
3 THE-COURT: Mr. Renn, so there's no question about 
4 this, has anyone made any promises to you or threats against 
5 you for the purpose of obtaining this plea, other than what 
6 I've heard here as a part of a plea bargain? 
7 A No, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Now, Mr. Renn, the entry of a plea of no 
9 contest is of such a nature that the Court will treat it as if 
io it were a plea of guilty, subject to the same penalties, in 
ii other words, even though it's no contest. Do you understand 
12 that? 
n A Yes, sir. 
H THE COURT: Do you understand that as far as the 
15 Court's concerned, if you enter a plea of no contest to this 
16 II offense, as has been explained to you, that there is a 
17 potential penalty of a felony in the second degree, which 
18 under the laws of the State of Utah is a term of not less than 
19 1 year nor more than 15 years, or a fine up to $10,000, or 
20 both fine and imprisonment? 
21 There was no firearm involved, was there. Counsel? 
22 MR. BROWN: There was not, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: So that is the potential sentence; do 
24 you understand that? 
25 MR. RENN: A Yes, Your Honor 
/<*. 
>»<h* V/ 
1
 THE COURT: Have you received a copy of the amended 
2
 information? 
3I A Yes
 f Your Honor. 
4
 THE COURT: I'd like the Clerk to read it so there 
5
 would be no question about it. Please read the amended 
6
 information. 
7
 tCLERK READ AMENDED INFORMATION] 
8
 THE COURT: The record should indicate that the 
9
 amended information has been read with a copy given to the 
10
 Defendant. 
11
 Once again, I want to run through the constitutional 
12
 rights so there's no question about it. I advise you that you 
13 have a right to have an Attorney at every step in the 
u proceedings before the Court; you have a right for a speedy 
15 trial by an impartial Jury; you have the right to confront and 
16 have your Attorney cross examine in open Court any witnesses 
17 that appear against you; you have a privilege against 
18 compulsory self-incrimination; you have a right to compulsory 
19 process for obtaining witnesses in your own defense. 
20 it requires an unanimous verdict by the Jury to 
21 convict you and if you are convicted, you have the right to 
22 appeal the case to the Court of Appeals of the State of Utah. 
,23 There are basically your constitutional rights. You 
24 have advised him of these rights, Counsel? 
25 MR. HUNT: I have, Your Honor. 
-20-
1 X ^ T H E COURT: In your opinion, does he understand 
2 them? ^ 
3 s J MR. HUNT: Yes, Your Honor. 
* / THE COURT: Based upon the plea bargain, nave you 
5 prepared an affidavit and agreement for the Defendant to sign, 
6 Counsel? 
7 MR. HUNT: We have. 
8 THE COURT: Is there any reason why I should not 
9 accept his plea at this time, Mr. Brown? 
io MR. BROWN: I'm aware of no reason, Your Honor. 
ii THE COURT: Is there any reason why I should not 
12 accept his plea, Mr. Hunt? 
13 MR. HUNTJ-. -No, Your Honor. 
u THE COURT: Is there any reason why I should not 
is accept your plea at this time, Mr. Renn? 
41 
16 II MR. RENN: Nof sir. 
17 THE COURT: The record should indicate that for the 
18 I purpose of the record, the Court's of the opinion that the 
19 Defendant has been advised of his constitutional rights, the 
20 consequence of the matter before the Court. The Court's of 
21 the opinion he intelligently understands urtiy he's here and 
22 that his plea is voluntary; that he is represented by Counsel; 
23 that the parties have entered into a plea bargain and the 
24 essence of the plea is that the Defendant will enter a plea of 
25 no contest to the charge. 
« _;Z/J[ 
10 
11 
1
 For the purpose of the record, Mr. David Arlan Renn, 
2
 as to the charge of manslaughter, as set forth in the amended 
3
 information, what is you are plea? Guilty or not guilty? Or 
4
 no contest? 
5
 MR, RENN: No contest. 
6
 THE COURT: The record should indicate that the 
7
 Defendant enters a plea of no contest to the offense charged. 
8
 The record should indicate the Defendant has 
9
 (I executed a plea agreement in open Court. He's executed a 
statement and has initialed every paragraph, showing he's read 
the same in open Court; that's correct, isn't it, Mr. Renn? 
*2 MR. RENN: Yes, sir. 
.13 THE COURT: Thank you. 
u The Court accepts them and they're ordered filed. 
15 And the Court finds that the Defendant's aware of his rights, 
16 he understands the offense charged, and he knou/ingly and 
17 intentionally and voluntarily entered his plea in this manner. 
IB The Court is signing the document at this time. 
19 The record should indicate that the Defendant 
20 entered a plea of no contest, as I've heretofore stated. 
21 What's your recommendation, Mr. Brown? 
22 MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I have assumed that the 
23 Court would be desiring a presentence report and we have no 
24 objection to that. 
25 THE COURT: Counsel? 
-22J 
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MR. HUNT: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Renn, both Attorneys have requested 
for the Court to have the advantage of a presentence 
investigation and report before I pronounce sentence; do you 
have any objection to this procedure? 
MR. RENN: No, Your Honor. 
COURT ORDER 
THE COURT: This matter is referred to the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole for a Presentence 
Investigation Report, Mr. Renn. This gentlemen standing right 
here is my Probation Officer, Mr. Richard Bagley. He will be 
handling your case. 
(INDICATED] 
As I stated, this matter is referred to the department and the 
time of sentencing is set for June 25th. All right, Mr. 
Bagley? Or is that too fast? 
MR. BAGLEY: Your Honor, because of not having a 
secretary at the office, if we could have a little more time 
it could be helpful. 
MR. HUNT: Your Honor, the other thing that may be 
of importance to Mr. Bagley is Mr. Renn is a recent move-in 
from California, so I assume that most of their stuff will 
have to come from out-of-state. 
THE COURT: The 11th of July? 
MR. BAGLEY: Yes. 
11 
12 
1
 THE COURT: Is that agreeable? 
2
 MR. BAGLEY: Yes. 
3
 THE COURT: Is that agreeable. Counsel? 
4
 MR. HUNT: Yes. 
5
 11 THE COURT: All right. This matter is set for July 
6
 11th at 10:00 o fclock a.m. 
7
 Is there any objection to the bond remaining the 
8
 same as heretofore set by the Magistrate? 
9
 MR. BROWN: No, Your Honor. 
10
 II THE COURT: It's so ordered. 
Now Mr. Renn, listen to me carefully because this 
order is in effect. You are out on bond, I believe. Is that 
13 right, Counsel? 
u MR. HUNT: That's correct, Your Honor, 
is THE COURT: It's the order of that Court you shall 
16 not use intoxicants of any type: No u/ine, no whiskey, no 
17 beer, not a drink, not one; 
18 You're not to use any illegal drugs, none; 
19 You're not to go in any tavern or beer hall or any 
20 place or where it's that type of an association; 
21 You're not to associate.with any known felons and 
22 you're not to be in any area where drugs are being dispensed; 
23 You shall submit your body for testing at the 
24 request of any police officer, without the necessity of a 
25 search warrant; 
-aY-i 
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1 II You shall not violate any law of any community, 
2 state, or nation in which you're located; 
3 Vou will meet with my Probation Officer. I advise 
4\\ you to cooperate fully with him and do what he says so he can 
5 make the best report possible. He'll be making a very 
61| detailed investigation. If you don't cooperate with him, if 
7 you're not honest with him, it's going to show up in that 
8 report; do you understand what I am saying? 
9 MR. RENN: Yes, Your Honor. 
io| THE COURT: I wouldn't have any alternative but to 
ii 11 take it into consideration. 
12 If you violated any order I made at this time and 
13 it's brought to my attention, I'll take that into 
14 consideration at the time of sentencing. 
15 Good luck, sir. We'll see you here on the 11th day 
16 || of July at 10:00 o'clock a.m. 
17 IWHEREUPON THE ABOVE ENTITLED PROCEEDINGS WERE 
18 COMPLETED] 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID A. RENN, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. 930600182 
/ 
The Motion of the Respondent, State of Utah, to Dismiss the 
Petitioner David A. Renn's Petition for Extraordinary Relief, is granted 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
The Court has examined the proceedings and finds that Renn's 
Plea was knowingly and voluntarily made with the advise of his attorney. 
Dated this (& day of^O^toher* 1993. 
a. AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
On th day of October, 1993, I mailed a copy of the above and 
foregoing Order to the following, postage prepaid, from offices at Manti, 
Utah: 
James H. Beadles, Assistant Attorney General, 
330 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
R. Don Brown, Sevier County Attorney, Richfield,Utah, 84701 
Lawrence Hunt, Attorney for Petitioner, 55 W. 100 N^ichfield, Utah, 84701 
.e B. Mello^ ^ 
Manti, Utah, 84642 _ ^ 
A D D E N D U M C 
* " •"» f » m\ mm 
~+t£ 
R. Don Brown #0464 
Sevier County Attorney 
Sevier County Courthouse 
250 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone! (801) 896-6812 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID A. RENN, 
VS. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner Pro Se, i 
Respondent. i 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. /?3cCCCtS'^ 
i Judge Don V. Tibbs 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, including Petitioner's 
Objection to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, dated October 15, 1993, and the 
Court having considered Petitioner's pleadings as constituting a motion to 
withdraw his plea of no contest to the offense of manslaughter, and being 
fully advised; 
The Court finds that the record in criminal case number 1217 before 
the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County reflects a knowing 
and voluntary plea by the Defendant, that the Defendant was fully advised as 
to the potential sentence, and that there has been no demonstrated violation 
of constitutional rights; 
_axj-
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£ dismiss is granted. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL was placed in the United States mail at 
Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the It — 
day of November, 1993, addressed as follows: 
David Renn 
#20173 B-329-B 
P. 0. Box 550 
Central Utah Correctional Facility 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
Mr. Lawrence H. Hunt 
Attorney at Law 
195 North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
\liinA,Lfe? - Xfr rtTirtP 
A D D E N D U M D 
MARKINGS ON DOCUMENT WERE MADE BY PETITIONER. SEE N.l 
R. Don Brown #0464 
Sevier County Attorney 
County Courthouse 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-6812 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVTER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
DAVTD A. RENN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
PLEA AGREEMENT 
Case No. 1217 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant, in full and complete settlement of 
— • I M M ^ I K i i m n i H 'T M I — i l l Min i i H I i ri ii i III mmmmt^^m^^mnm . ..... 
the above criminal action, agree as follows: 
1. The Defendant was initially charged with the crime of Murder in 
the Second Degree, a First Degree Felony. 
2. The Plaintiff has filed an Amended Information charging the 
W-"*-!**-*****.,* 
Defendant with the offense of Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony. 
•lira1" —* - ~ »ilW>. !>•«»«»* 
3. The Plaintiff has agreed to file such reduced charge in return 
for the entry of a plea of no contest by the Defendant to such charge. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
R. DON BROWN 
Sevier County Attorney 
APPROVED: 
LAWRENCE H. HUNT DAVID A. RENN 
Counsel for the Defendant Defendant 
A D D E N D U M E 
MARKINGS ON DOCUMENT WERE MADE BY PETITIONER. SEE N.l 
Sevier County Attorney 
County Courthouse 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-6812 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
DAVID A. RENN, 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SEVIER 
Plaintiff, i 
Defendant. i 
) 
t ss. 
) 
STATEMENT 
i OF DEFENDANT 
r Case No. 1217 
Comes now Defendant David A. Renn and, as verified by his initials 
next to each paragraph, acknowledges that he has read and understands each 
provision: 
1. I understand that I have been charged with the offense of 
Murder in the Second Degree, a Felony of the First Degree, carrying a possible 
sentence of not less than five years and which may be for life in the Utah 
State Prison and/or a Ten Thousand Dollar ($10,000.00) fine. 
2. I understand that such offense would require that the 
Plaintiff prove^-t>eyond a reasonable doubt, each of the following elements: 
a. That on or about the 16th day of February, 1990, I caused 
the death ?f ap^h»r 
b. That the death was caused: 
(i) intentionally or knowingly, or 
Page 3—Statement of Defendant 
State of Utah vs. David A. Renn 
7. I understand that I have the right to be helped by an attorney 
throughout my entire case, including a trial and an appeal. If I cannot 
afford my own attorney, the judge will appoint one to help me. 
8. I understand that I have the right to plead "not guilty- and 
go to trial if I want to do so. 
9. I understand that I have the right to a jury trial, which 
includes the following! 
A. I have the right to be helped by an attorney; 
B. I have the right to see and listen to the witnesses who 
testify against me; 
C. My attorney can cross-examine all the witnesses who 
testify against me; 
D. I can call my own witnesses to help me, and if they do 
not want to come to my trial, I can use subpoenas to make them come and 
testify on my behalf; 
E. I cannot be forced to take the witness stand and admit my 
guilt, and I do not have to testify at my trial unless I want to do so; 
F. If I decide not to testify, the jury will be instructed 
that they cannot assume that I am guilty just because I did not testify; 
G. I understand that I am presumed to be innocent of the 
charges against me, and that this presumption will end only if each 
member of the jury is convinced of my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 
H. If I go to trial and I am convicted, I have the right to 
appeal my conviction. If I cannot afford my own attorney for my appeal, 
rage :>—statement or ueienaant 
State of Utah vs. David A. Renn 
14. I am not now under the influence of any drugs, medication or 
intoxicants, and I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or 
intoxicants when I went through this form. 
15. I know of no reason why I should not plead no contest to the 
charge contained in the Information. 
16. I can read, write, and understand the English language. 
17. I am not presently being treated for mental illness that 
would affect my ability to voluntarily and knowingly make this guilty plea. 
18. I understand that the court will treat my plea of no contest 
the same as if I had entered a plea of guilty for purposes of sentencing. 
Signed in open court this day of May, 1990. 
DAVID A. RENN 
The Court finds that the Defendant is aware of his rights, that he 
understands the offense charged and he is knowingly, intentionally and 
voluntarily entering his plea. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
DON V. TIBBS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
A D D E N D U M F 
R, Don Brown #0464 
Sevier County Attorney 
County Courthouse 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone * 896-6812 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
DAVID A. REHN, 
Plaintiff, i 
Defendant. i 
AMENDED 
i INFORMATION 
i Case No. 1217 
The undersigned, Sgt. Charles C. Roberts, Sevier County Sheriff's 
Office, states on information and belief that the Defendant committed the 
crime oft 
MANSLAUGHTER, contrary to Section 76-5-205, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, in that said Defendant, at the County of Sevier, State of. 
Utah, on or about the 16th day of February, 1990, didt 
(a) recklessly cause the death of another; or 
(b) cause the death of another under the influence of extreme 
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse; 
or 
(c) cause the death of another under circumstances where the 
defendant reasonably believed the circumstances provided a legal justification 
or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or 
excusable under the existing circumstances, all of which constitutes a Second 
Degree Felony. 
Mi i 
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This information is based on evidence obtained from the following 
witnesses: Dr. Robert Potts, Kim Sorenson 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
R. DON BROWN 
Sevier County Attorney 
ribed and sworn to before me this 
^ ^ S a v ^ o f Mayf 1990. 
-HI-
